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Introduction
My interest in Latin America’s political shift leftward began in December 2005
when Bolivia’s Evo Morales became the region’s first indigenous president. I found a
BBC interactive map entitled ‘‘Latin America’s Year of the Election,’ indicating twelve
presidential elections between November 2005 and December 2006. This potential for
political change fascinated me. Later that month, I moved to Valparaiso and experienced
all of the excitement and emotions surrounding the presidential election run-off between
Michele Bachelet and Sebastian Pinera. Bachelet’s victory triggered massive
celebrations and the Chileans appeared genuinely excited about their newly elected
president. Upon my return to the U.S., I began researching the development and success
of leftist parties throughout the region.
Since 2005 the term “pink wave'’ or “pink tide

the left-of-center political

movement within Latin America away from U.S.-based neoliberal reforms toward greater
social investment- became prevalent to describe a new phenomenon within Latin
America. After the media popularized it, the term has received varying definitions,
ranging from something as radical as a movement within Latin America toward socialism
to interpretations as moderate as a gradual movement away from neoliberal reforms. In
general, the pink wave is a reaction to previous U.S.-imposed economic reforms. It has
arisen in individual countries. This thesis analyzes the pink wave by contextualizing it in

Latin America’s Year of the Election.” BBC News. Nov 2005.
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the political science literature and ultimately evaluating its legitimacy as a
characterization to describe the political change in Latin America.
Both Bolivia's Evo Morales and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez governments are at
the forefront of the left-of-center politics in the region with their attempts to introduce
progressive social and economic programs, and their harsh criticisms of the U.S.
Because of Bolivia and Venezuela’s growing regional importance, I will focus on the
governments of Morales' and Chavez’s role in furthering their progressive political
platform through the utilization of natural resource revenues. With Hugo Chavez making
comments such as, “I am convinced that the path to a new, better and possible world is
not capitalism, the path is socialism,'’ the media misconstrues such quotations as actual
implemented policy, instead of purely rhetoric. ^ Therefore, to correctly identify the
actual governing ideology of both Chavez and Morales, it is necessary to evaluate their
implemented policies. With the rapidly increasing price of oil, both governments are
reaping the benefits, so it is possible to compare how each government spends its
windfall natural resource revenue to determine the policy preferences of each
government. Both countries feature the most radical leaders within the region in terms of
political rhetoric and platform. Identifying their governing ideology will identify how far
left the pink wave spreads on the political spectrum.
Both presidents have made the control of natural resources central planks in their
respective political platforms. In 2005, Morales said that, ^‘the government will exercise
its right to state ownership of Bolivia's hydrocarbons.”^ In the same year, Chavez said

^ Jorge Martin. “‘The path is socialism’ President Chavez reaffirms opposition to capitalism. 1 March
2005. www.marxist.com
^ Juan Forero. “Bolivia's Newly Elected Leader Maps His Socialist Agenda.” New York Times. 20 Dec.
2005.
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Introduction
My interest in Latin America’s political shift leftward began in December 2005
when Bolivia's Evo Morales became the region’s first indigenous president. I found a
BBC interactive map entitled “Latin America’s Year of the Election,” indicating twelve
presidential elections between November 2005 and December 2006.* This potential for
political change fascinated me. Later that month, I moved to Valparaiso and experienced
all of the excitement and emotions surrounding the presidential election run-off between
Michele Bachelet and Sebastian Pinera. Bachelet’s victory triggered massive
celebrations and the Chileans appeared genuinely excited about their newly elected
president. Upon my return to the U.S., I began researching the development and success
of leftist parties throughout the region.
Since 2005 the term “pink wave” or “pink tide

the left-of-center political

movement within Latin America away from U.S.-based neoliberal reforms toward greater
social investment

became prevalent to describe a new phenomenon within Latin

America. After the media popularized it, the term has received varying definitions,
ranging from something as radical as a movement within Latin America toward socialism
to interpretations as moderate as a gradual movement away from neoliberal reforms. In
general, the pink wave is a reaction to previous U.S.-imposed economic reforms. It has
arisen in individual countries. This thesis analyzes the pink wave by contextualizing it in

Latin America’s Year of the Election.

BBC News. Nov 2005.
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the political science literature and ultimately evaluating its legitimacy as a
characterization to describe the political change in Latin America.
Both Bolivia's Evo Morales and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez governments are at
the forefront of the left-of-center politics in the region with their attempts to introduce
progressive social and economic programs, and their harsh criticisms of the U.S.
Because of Bolivia and Venezuela’s growing regional importance, I will focus on the
governments of Morales' and Chavez's role in furthering their progressive political
platform through the utilization of natural resource revenues. With Hugo Chavez making
comments such as,

am convinced that the path to a new, better and possible world is

not capitalism, the path is socialism," the media misconstrues such quotations as actual
implemented policy, instead of purely rhetoric. ^ Therefore, to correctly identify the
actual governing ideology of both Chavez and Morales, it is necessary to evaluate their
implemented policies. With the rapidly increasing price of oil, both governments are
reaping the benefits, so it is possible to compare how each government spends its
windfall natural resource revenue to determine the policy preferences of each
government. Both countries feature the most radical leaders within the region in terms of
political rhetoric and platform. Identifying their governing ideology will identify how far
left the pink wave spreads on the political spectrum.
Both presidents have made the control of natural resources central planks in their
respective political platforms. In 2005, Morales said that, “the government will exercise
its right to state ownership of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons.” ^ In the same year, Chavez said

" Jorge Martin. “ ‘The path is socialism’ President Chavez reaffirms opposition to capitalism.” 1 March
2005. www.marxist.com
^ Juan Forero. “Bolivia's Newly Elected Leader Maps His Socialist Agenda.” New York Times. 20 Dec.
2005.
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that some contracts "are robbing the Venezuelan people of its legitimate right to the
wealth of its natural resources ... what we are doing is to recover national sovereignty
over our own resources!"'^ Each country possesses extremely large natural resource
deposits. The government generates a substantial amount of revenue, which both
presidents have the ability to control for their own purposes. This additional revenue
gives Morales and Chavez a great deal of freedom to implement more of their preferred
policies. The analysis of the utilization of natural resource revenues will serve as a
window to analyze their political styles in the left-of-center spectrum. The natural
resource revenue allows these politicians to spend governmental funds on developing
their social and economic development policies, which for the purposes of this study will
serve as a measure of their true governing ideology. The styles and systems of
government of Morales and Chavez are evaluated through analyzing the utilization of
natural resource revenues.
There are four parts to this thesis: an introduction, a case study on Bolivia, a case
study on Venezuela and a comparison of the Morales and Chavez governments. The first
chapter serves as an introduction to the relevant literature, concepts and history. It
establishes a theoretical understanding to frame the case studies in a manner that makes
them useful for a critical evaluation of the notion of a “pink wave. It begins with a brief
overview of the different periods of political transitions that the region experienced since
the 1930s and describes the cyclical nature of successions of democratic and nondemocratic governments. Next, I discuss in more depth the democratization movement
since 1978. I identify a gradual leftward political movement as a way to set up a proper

David Coleman. “Chavez Frias reiterates mine reform policy; wire services still get it wrong!” 22 Sept.
2005. http://www.vheadline.com
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understanding of the historical roots of the “pink wave, Finally, in Chapter one, I
explain and define the “pink wave’' and the major styles and systems of governance
(socialism, social democratic,(neo) populism) that have emerged in Latin America since
the third wave of democratization.
The second chapter is the case study of Bolivia. I analyze how the Morales
government has used windfall hydrocarbon revenues to advance his political agenda and
promote social change. After briefly describing the history of Bolivia from independence
to the election of their first indigenous president Morales, the chapter analyzes the
intertwined role of the hydrocarbons industry and politics in the country. The indigenous
movement has allied itself directly with the hydrocarbons industry and has frequently
lobbied for its nationalization as a way to receive more benefits. Evo Morales’
government represents a progressive left-of-center ideology centered on both the
indigenous movement and those who support nationalizing the hydrocarbon industry. By
evaluating the policies utilizing natural resource revenues in Morales’ presidency, I can
analyze the pink wave within the region. This chapter serves to demonstrate how the
Morales government has used its unique position to reshape the hydrocarbon industry and
implement programs to benefit the indigenous population by utilizing natural resource
revenues to try and reshape the Bolivian political landscape.
The third chapter is the case study of Venezuela. It evaluates how the Chavez
government has promoted and advanced a social and economic development platform.
He has modified existing governmental organizations through using presidential decrees
and created new policies that the rapidly increasing price of oil in the world markets
funded. In this chapter, I analyze how the Chavez government has utilized its windfall

4

hydrocarbon revenues. I also examine the changes in the petroleum industry due to the
recent constitutional revisions. Specifically. I will focus on how Chavez has targeted the
lower classes with social and economic development policies focusing on: poverty
reduction, literacy improvement, greater educational benefits and general social welfare
improvement.
In Chapter four, I relate the information researched in the two case studies to
identify specific the styles and governing ideologies exhibited by the Morales and Chavez
governments. This information will serve to revise the conceptual framework discussed
in the first chapter. This chapter ties back to chapter one by analyzing Morales’ and
Chavez’s political styles with the definition of traditional populism. The next section of
this chapter specifically assesses how each government utilizes the windfall natural
resource revenues in terms of social and economic improvements within their individual
countries. The political styles and governing ideologies of the Morales and Chavez
governments become evident from the broader political environment coupled with the
actual policies implemented to make use of natural resources. After applying the
framework of Chapter one to the Morales and Chavez governments, the pink wave will
be evaluated as a term and a concept to describe the specific case studies and the entire
region. The analysis in the case studies and the initial part of Chapter four will serve as a
means to modify the definition of the pink wave.
Finally, in the epilogue 1 discuss the role of Venezuela and Bolivia within Latin
America and the world considering recent political activities.

5

Chapter One
With popular phrases such as “pink wave,” “third wave of democratization” and
“neopopulist” being used to label Latin American regimes, it is important to understand
their context before their legitimacy and accuracy can be evaluated with respect to the
region as a whole and specifically Bolivia and Venezuela. Those phrases have arisen due
to the perceived leftist movement since 2000 in Latin America. To analyze the
authenticity of these characterizations, the structure and styles of governance in the
region and evaluate the particular policies that individual governments are enacting must
be understood.
In this thesis, I will distinguish between a governing ideology (e.g. socialism,
social democracy, communism, etc.) and a style of government (e.g. populism,
neopopulism, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, etc.) in terms of evaluating the government
in power. Different governing ideologies tend to promote particular ideas, while styles of
government vary on the ideological spectrum. Peter Smith defines a democratic
government as having:(1)the principle of participation, such that no substantial segment
of the population is excluded from the effective pursuit of political power;(2)the
principle of competition, such that there are free, fair, and regular elections; and (3)the
principle of accountability, such that political rulers and elected representatives serve as

6

‘agents' of their constituencies and must justify their actions and decisions in order
remain in office.^
The only manner to arrive at a political democracy is “a pacific and negotiated
one based upon initial liberalization and on the subsequent introduction of institutions of
electoral competition, interest representation and executive accountability — with the
trade-off and uncertainties such a course.,.entails.

O’Donnell, Schmitter, and

Whitehead point to an initial liberalization within a non-democratic regime that allows
for greater civil liberties and lessening of repression as a necessary step for a transition to
democracy. It is important to distinguish between consolidated and non-consolidated
democracies. A consolidated democracy exists when “under given political and
„7
economic conditions a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town.
The gap between a consolidated and a non-consolidated democratic government is
bridged through the “resurrection and reinvigoration of those groups within civil society
that exist outside the boundaries of recognized and sanctioned public activity [coupled
with] substantive policy outcomes which citizens could identify as contributing to a
widening and deepening of political, socio-economic and cultural opportunities within
society.

Most Latin American countries do not meet the five necessary prerequisites

^ Peter H. Smith. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005. (7).
^ Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (eds.). Transitionsfrom
Authoritarian Rule: Prospectsfor Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. (vol. 4,
34).
^ A. Przeworski. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms ofEastern Europe and
Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. (26).
* Geraldine Lievesley. Democracy in Latin America: Mobilization, power and the searchfor a new
politics." Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. (15).
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that must exist for the development of a consolidated democracy, but unconsolidated
democracy is evident and strong.‘^
A go\ ernment is not able to deal with major socio-economic change without the
presence of a consolidated democracy. Rapid social change is likely to destroy fragile
democratic transitions because in a transitioning democracy the attempts to include a
majority of the population will result in moderate policies. Therefore, because of the
overwhelming desire for political stability, the left-of-center parties “must accept limited
,10

progress for an undetermined future until consolidation is achieved.’

The emergence of

the pink wave and the rise of the Icft-of-center parties will immediately challenge the
strength of the respective unconsolidated democracies in which they exist by attempting
to issue substantial, legislated social changes. The democratic process throughout the
region has been respected and bipartisan politics have limited sudden and drastic political
changes, which have allowed the governments to remain democratically strong despite
differing styles of government.
Brief History of the 1930s to Present
Classical populism arose in many Latin American countries because of an
increased modernization of industries by changing economic policy preference to importsubstituting industrialization (ISI).*' Classical populism according to Political Scientist

^ The five prerequisites are conditions for the development of a free and lively civil society; relatively
autonomous and valued political society; rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and
independent associational life; state bureaucracy to be used by the new democratic government; an
institutionalized economic society. Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. Problems ofDemocratic Transition
and Consolidation; Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore; Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996. (7).
Lievesley,(13).
*' In Argentina, this time was characterized by Evita and Juan Peron. In Brazil, the period 1945-64 was
considered the era of the “Populist Republic” through the regimes of Getulio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek,
Janio Quadros and Joao Goulart; Michael Conniff. “Introduction.” Populism in Latin America. Ed.
Michael Conniff. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999.(11).
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Kurt Weyland is “a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or
exercises government power based on direct, unmediated uninstitutionalized support
from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers. This direct, quasi-personal
relationship bypasses established intermediary organizations or deinstitutionalizes and
,42

subordinates them to the leader’s personal will.

In an economic sense, classical

populism uses “budget deficits to stimulate economic domestic demand; nominal wage
increases plus price controls to effect income redistribution; and exchange-rate control or
,43

appreciation to cut inflation and to raise wages and profits in nontraded-goods sectors.
ISl caused rapid urbanization and industrialization that—according to the modernization
theory—sparked mass participation and undermined traditional parties, thus opening the
political door to classical populists who campaigned for elections that were more open
and widened the franchise in their appeal to the excluded mass migrants.
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism replaced classical populism in the early 1960s. ISI
policies were stagnating due to the declining purchasing power and shifting political
opinions. These policies were not abandoned. They continued with greater control and
economic restraint under the military governments. The military claimed to pursue
missions of national redemption by eradicating communist subversion and containing
working class organization through political and economic repression, strategic alliances
with economic elites and technocrats to design economic policies.*"* Especially after the
Cuban revolution, the military began repressing and removing leftist opposition in their

12

Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics,"
Comparative Politics 34 (October 2001): 14.
Robert R. Kaufman, and Barbara Stallings. “The Political Economy of Latin American Populism.” The
Macroeconomics ofPopulism in Latin America. Eds. Rudiger Dombusch and Sebastian Edwards.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.(16).
Peter H. Smith. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005. (47).

9

countries under the pretense of national security because they accused them of stirring up
the masses, fhese dictatorships strived to revitalize their economies. They took out large
loans from international lending organizations, which then made the government’s
dependant upon them for economic growth. The traditional, agriculture-based, economic
elites deelined in importance due to the greater focus on manufacturing, which helped
develop a middle class. This period of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, especially in the
Southern Cone with Operation Condor and Central America, was characterized by
military dictatorships that achieved economic success at the expense of tens of thousands
of disappearances.
I'he debt crises resulting from changing prices of oil in the 1970s and early 1980s,
the extensive external borrowing and the rise in U.S. interest rates, combined with the
growth of the middle class fostered the movement away from military rule toward
democracy. After the debt crises in the 1980s, numerous Latin American nations took
IMF and World Bank provided loans to help their struggling economies on the condition
of implementing strict neoliberal reforms within their countries. These reforms,
commonly known as the Washington Consensus, focused on fiscal responsibility, free
trade, competitive exchange rates and privatization. Countries implemented these
policies to promote economic development in efforts to establish and consolidate
democratic development. They did not succeed in the creation ofjobs, reduction of
poverty and attenuation of the inequality gap to develop to the degree imagined for
economic independence. Military governments lost the support of the middle class,
which began the transition to democratic governments.

10

Democratization in Latin America
The democratization framework was first consolidated in Samuel P. Huntington’s
book The Third ffave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, which described
the cyclical pattern of the ebb and flow of democracies in the twentieth century and
postulated that after a series of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and
1970s, there was a mass movement toward democratization started with Portugal’s
independence in 1974. From 1974 to 1990 over thirty countries transitioned from
military regimes to democracies and Huntington labels most Latin American countries as
following the ‘‘cyclical pattern'* that “oscillate between more populist democratic
governments and more conservative military regimes.

Many times due to unstable

levels of prevalent corruption, radicalism and disorder within democratic governments,
military regimes arose in efforts to stabilize the government; similarly, they were
overthrown when their support unravels or the military is unable to provide significant
economic progress. Huntington identifies certain nations as in “transition zones” of
16

intermediate economic development as a similar deterrent toward democracy,

As the

economic situations of these countries improved, so did the likelihood of democratic
governments. The political environment became more open toward sustaining
democratic governments because of the increased manufacturing sector created more
employment and helped to create and strengthen the middle class. The democratization

15

The Latin American countries that transitioned were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and Peru; Samuel P. Huntington. The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University Press of Oklahoma
Press, 1991. (41).
16
Huntington uses Mitchell Seligson’s argument that in Latin America the threshold that made democracy
possible was through per Capita GDP(1957 dollars) of$250 and 50 percent literacy rate. In 1957 only
Chile, Argentina and Costa Rica exhibited those characteristics and were democratic at the time, but by
1990 seven more nations—Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and, marginally,
Honduras reached this threshold and simultaneously were or have transitioned to democracy.
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framework has been intluential ideologically and used to explain the cyclical political
transition in the region.
The serious negali\ e economic and social ramifications from the adherence to
Washington Consensus policy recommendations created a political situation that paved
the way for populism to reemerge. Different Latin American governments subscribed to
these reforms because of economic necessity in hopes of drastic improvements and
stability. At least sixteen Latin American countries instituted Washington Consensus
17

reforms.

These neoliberal conditions simultaneously stipulated stringent political

reforms such as extensive privatizations, fiscal policy discipline, deregulation, trade
liberalization and a competitive exchange rate. Governments did not recover from the
economic policies of the previous governments and the results of current neoliberal
reforms were not realized. Latin America perpetuated its dependence on Western
capitalism and orthodox policy recommendations for assistance to alleviate further
economic digression during the 1980s, or the “lost decade.

The governments

subscribed to these reforms to gain economic (and ultimately political) independence.
When the U.S. economic situation reduced the incentive for international investment, it
had a debilitating effect that resulted in the crash of the Mexican currency and
19

abandonment of foreign investments, or the Tequila Effect.

Governments continued to

be dependent upon these economic conditions despite marginal economic growth,
because unemployment and poverty were not reduced. Unlike under the bureaucratic-

17

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
18
It was called the lost decade because real economic output(GDP)per capita showed a cumulative decline
of almost ten percent throughout the decade.
19
When the U.S. Federal Reserve increased interest rates in 1994, it prompted greater confidence in the
U.S. market and since a majority of foreign investment was a portfolio investment(stocks and bonds) as
opposed to direct investment, the investors were able to abandon their investments quickly.
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authoritarian governments, the informal sector and the poor were able to organize. These
newly emerging sectors coupled with the demand tor a new fresh, political outsider paved
the way for the return on populism in Latin America. The adherence to neoliberal
economic policies prepared the region for the return of populism because it prompted the
organization of informal labor, weakened existing political institutions and diminished
the public's trust in the government.
Populism thus returned to the region, but in a different form from earlier decades.
Now citizens demand greater economic progress and greater accountability. Sometimes
called neopopulism, it diverges from classical populism because there is more
dependency on the private sector, confidential responses from private citizens and
20

personalistic leadership, while there is less institutionalization,

It also differs from

traditional populism because of a stronger role of the executive, larger emphasis on social
programs, increased support from dissatisfied voters and greater focus on economic
progress. Economically, these politicians respect the free market, which substantially
differs from classical populists, who are characterized by irresponsible economic
21

decision-making.

Neopopulism emerged as a different style of government that

employs responsible economic policy coupled with traditional populist characteristics.
Traditional populism, according to Kenneth Roberts, focuses on(1) personalistic and
paternalistic political leadership with a(2) diverse, multi-class coalition through(3)topdown political mobilization gamering support through (4)clientelistic economic projects

20

Weyland (2001),(16).
Kurt Weyland. “Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How much Affinity?” Proceedings
at the XXIV International Congress on Neopopulism in Latin America: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.
27-29 March 2003. Dallas, TX. 2003. 1-23. (2).
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to build a material foundation for popular support.

Recently, neopopulism has taken

root in Latin America because politicians can take advantage of frustrated voters looking
for immediate and drastic change from the current political direction of their
governments.
In L.atin America, there is a histor>^ of both right-of-center and left-of-center
populism, fhe recent political science literature has commented upon the rise of left-ofcenter neopopulism frequently, especially highlighting Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez,
Bolivia's Lvo Morales, Ecuador's Rafael Correa and Nicaragua’s Deiniel Ortega as
examples(Weyland 2002, Roberts 2006, Castaneda 2006). Presidents like Carlos
Menem of Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and Alberto Fujimori ofPeru
23

are examples right-of-center neopopulists,

They used traditional populistic methods to

be elected (such as charismatic speeches proclaiming to run against the establishment and
direct appearances on television to the unorganized masses), but in office enacted
stringent structural adjustments and neoliberal economic policies while continuing to
reinforce their political and personal leadership. Upon taking office, these presidents
passed rigorous structural reforms that required economic readjustment and marketoriented restructuring, which in the short-term called for cutting public spending and
reducing demand to combat hyperinflation. These policies resulted in deep recession.
Taking advice of international financial institutions, the executives ratified
neoliberal economic policies like minimizing state intervention to give the market more
free reign, opening their economies to foreign trade and investment and forcing domestic

22

Kenneth Roberts. Populism and Democracy in Latin America. (Carter Center) 2000.
These presidents represent the reemergence of right-of-center populism. Currently, Chavez, Morales,
Correa and Ortega are representatives of the return of left-of-center populism.

23

14

24

industries to become more etficient.

The advice of the international organizations left

the leaders with a modicum of intluence in economic policy, but they inevitably used
their minimized authority to ensure that the required neoliberal policies would not restrict
their personal leadership or undermine their popularity. Surprisingly, neoliberal
adjustments “provided new opportunities for strengthening personal leadership. Despite
„25

their high initial costs, they actually boosted leaders^ popularity,

Since the 1980s,

populism with neoliberal economic policies has reemerged as a viable option of
politicians from all degrees of ideological background. Because populism is a style of
government there is no political ideological prerequisite. The reemergence ofthe rightof-center populists arrived a decade before the recurrence of left-of-center populists.
Huntington argues through the definition of the waves of democratization that the recent
democratic governments follow the tenets of the democratization framework through
having populistic and neopopulistic aspects in a democratic system.
The Pink Wave
Left-of-center parties continue to gain political support and this movement has
been referred to as the “pink wave, In the 1980s and 1990s, democratic governments
continued to emerge and grow stronger in the region. The twenty-first century welcomed
a democratic Latin America that was ideologically drifting away from the United States.
With the end of the Cold War, Latin America began declining in international importance
to the United States. While the U.S. lessened its aggressive military attempts to influence
politics in the region, many countries still lived under the U.S. prescribed neoliberal
economic reforms. The population became disenchanted with the neoliberal reforms and

24
25

Weyland (1999),(180).
Ibid.,(181).
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capitalism. They still wanted their government to be procedurally democratic, but not
necessarily capitalistic. I'his change in sentiment allowed the left to make a comeback
within the region since 2000.
Neoliberal reforms are most effective in a relative democracy that provides
governmental structure and efficiency to ensure that neoliberal reforms are completely
26

carried through.

Given the long-term time scale necessary to receive the benefits of

neoliberal reforms, the population will "demand an alternative to neoliberalism...one that
achieves more incorporation of the excluded, and achieves it more quickly. If, as
generally has been the case, they fail to advance or even to envisage such an alternative.
they will persist in the election of leaders and parties who cling to a self-defeating
-27

economic populism.

After the most recent democratization movement in Latin

America and with the diminishing influence of the U.S. after the Cold War,the region
began to lose faith in a democratic system of government associated with neoliberal
28

reforms because of the unrealized economic and social improvements.

Politicians who

distanced themselves from neoliberal policies gained support from lower and lowermiddle class people who were still waiting for social and economic improvements.
Commonly called the ‘‘pink wave”, it is not a monolithic movement of all Latin
American countries to shift to the ideological left and away from the United States. It
represents a sentiment of dissatisfaction among voters caused by insufficient economic
growth and the systematic failure of traditional institutions of representative democracy
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-29

to ensure a higher standard ofliving for everyone,

It refers to a rise in left-of-center

populism that countered the right-of-center populism that emerged with Menem, Collar
and Fujimori in the 1990s. Many politicians have captured the vote of those still waiting
for the promises of the Washington Consensus through using populistic rhetoric,
advocating a greater ideological distance from the U.S. and obtaining serious
improvements in the realms of social policy. There is a gradual, conscious movement by
the citizens for political and social change and believe government is the best method of
transformation. Yet, ideologically the pink wave cannot be construed as a unilateral
leftist movement. It represents many different types of leftist governments in power such
as (neo) populist, socialist and social democratic governments that are shifting to the left.
The emerging governments are characterized as, “one is modem,open-minded, reformist,
and internationalist, and it springs, paradoxically, from the hard-core left of the past. The
other, born of the great tradition of Latin American populism, is nationalist, strident, and
,,30

close-minded.

For example, the governments in Bolivia (President Evo Morales),

Brazil (President Lula da la Silva), Ecuador (President Rafeal Correa), Chile (President
Michele Bachelet), Nicaragua (President Daniel Ortega) and Argentina (President Nestor
Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner) have all risen to power during the period of
the pink wave, yet despite being left-of-center governments they represent vastly
different styles of government. The success of these individual left-of-center politicians
has been popularized within the media as the “pink wave” to identify this political
change.
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However there are a number of types of lefl-of-center governments in the region.
Many neopopulist politieians have declared sympathy toward Cuban President Fidel
Castro in attempts to unify and spread the leftist movement throughout the region.
Castro, a Cuban socialist, has represented a socialist alternative in the region. Socialism
is the “political theorv the central tenets of which are that the means of production should
be taken into collecti\ c or common ownership and that, as far as possible, market
,,31

ownership should be replaced by other forms of distribution based on social needs.
U.S. influence diminished at the end of the Cold War, which allowed smaller socialist
parties to gain greater support in individual countries. While no country other than Cuba
has a socialist party in power. Chilean President Michele Bachelet is a member of the
Socialist Party of Chile. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez has advocated “21^^ Century
Socialism", whose tenets will be different from twentieth century socialism, because “it
„32

would be a socialism that would be more pluralistic and less state-centered,

Chavez

wants to depart from the pure capitalistic system toward a form of government “based in
,33

solidarity, in fraternity, in love, injustice, in liberty, and in equality.'

In addition,

Chavez has provided substantial oil-driven investments in Cuba to help fund socialist
projects within the island to allow it to maintain its anti-Americanism. Despite his vague
definition of twenty-first socialism, the executives of Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua
have all agreed to participate in it and attempt to ideologically steer their countries in the
similar direction.
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A variant ol socialism within the region is social democracy. Social democracy is
a ‘"political doctrine that claims an important role for the state and the community in the
shaping and directing a society’s economic and social life. Social democracy differs from
socialism because it is committed to preserv ation of a largely capitalist and free market
economy, but shares with it an emphasis on the importance of redistribution of wealth
and income so that citizens may have social and economic conditions that effectively
-34

provide for reasonable equality of opportunity,

While Michele Bachelet is a member

of the Soeialist Party of Chile, the ruling, coalition party Concertacion de Partidospor la
Democracia is a social democratic party. Social democracy has gained in popularity in
the region since the third wave of democratization because the Washington Consensus
failed to improve the living situations of the impoverished. Many politicians captured the
negative sentiments toward neoliberal reforms and formed social democratic parties to
advocate greater social advancement by maintaining a democratic and capitalistic form of
government. Brazilian President Lula da Silva, former Brazilian President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez are all examples of social
democratic party executives in power.
The rise of the Left was a series of disjointed, country-specific political and
ideological movements, Hugo Chavez has attempted to unify and legitimize it as an antihegemonic and anti-neoliberal movement of Latin American countries against the U.S.
and the capitalist system in general. Chavez is using Venezuela’s oil revenues, valued at
more than $50 billion a year, to counter the influence of the United States and multilateral
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lending organizations like the International Monetary Fund,

He is trying to extend his

influence by financially supporting left-of-center candidates and providing natural
resources at a discounted rate. These policies have helped left-of-center politicians
Ortega of Nicaragua, Correa of Ecuador and Kirchner of Argentina by providing
petroleum bonds, funding Venezuelan assistance programs and constructing petroleum
36

pipelines,

Cha\ cz has also pledged to provide petroleum at a non-fluctuating price in

exchange for goods and services within the Caribbean region through the alliance
Petrocaribe.
The Left has benefited from the reemergence of populism because of its ability to
bypass traditional institutions to allow an individual to reach executive power. Populism
offers the greatest potential challenge to democratic stability. It provides a shortcut to
inclusive popular movements and establishes a direct link between leaders and crowds,
which makes it susceptible “to become undone by the ebb and flow of the political
37

energy of the people.'"

Populist politicians are able to gamer short-term political gains

through criticizing the old establishment, but risk long-term damage for democratic
institutions. The poor economic history and growing anti-Americanism throughout the
region has provided the opportunity for left-of-center populists to appear as appealing
candidates because of their reformist policies, social policy emphasis and distance from
current political system.
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Chapter Two: Case Study on Bolivia
In December 2005, with the election of Evo Morales, Bolivia was propelled into the
political forefront after the electoral victory of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and the eleven
other elections looming in 2006 in Latin America. Bolivia, which has the largest
percentage of indigenous citizens in South America, has encountered a recurrent
resistance to political change by a large percentage of this population. Most of the
indigenous population and poverty exists in western Bolivia, yet the preponderance of
industry and hydrocarbon revenue is located in the east. This geographic difference has
led to a serious social and economic disparity and tension between the two regions.
President Evo Morales has implemented and promised to enact legislation to change the
political environment significantly from previous regimes through escalating the roles of
the indigenous population in the government and increasing the state’s presence in the
hydrocarbon industry.
Historical Background of the Country
Beginning with the Spanish colonization in the sixteenth-century,Bolivia has
provided primary goods and natural resources to the developed world. Ever since Bolivia
has experienced boom-and-bust cycles centered on silver, tin, quinine, rubber, coca,
petroleum and, most recently, natural gas. The profits from increased natural resource
exports led to temporary development projects within Bolivia, but generally, they were
followed by economic contractions in the export economy. This typically resulted in
depressions and/ or recessions and political instability. The success of the tin and silver
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exports determined the longev ity of the Bolivian presidency until the 1930s, when both
began to decline and in 1932, Bolivia entered into war against Paraguay in the Chaco
War. From the Chaco War until 1982 Bolivia cycled between military dictatorships and
limited-representational governments.
As the silver, tin and petroleum industries diminished, the natural gas industry'
began gaining economic importance. Natural gas replaced tin as Bolivia’s leading export
38

in 1983.

,in
Because of mismanagement of natural resources by previous governments

1983 Bolivia had accrued significant foreign debt and a hyperinflation rate of 24,000%.
Bolivia took IMF loans and the advice of U.S. economist Jeffery Sachs, both of whom
advocated maintaining private control of industries, heavy foreign investment and limtted
state involvement. The reforms created a severe economic recession with wages falling
and unemployment skyrocketing. Despite the implementation of these reforms, there has
been increased economic disparity, poverty(59%)and political unrest, while the GDP
growth rate has been less than 2% since 1985. Like the previous export-oriented
industries, the concentration of wealth and political control remained in the hands of a
small percentage of eastern Bolivians.
History of Hydrocarbons
Democracy emerged in 1982. The initial steps toward establishing a democratic
Bolivia occurred with the 1952 Revolution, when the Movimiento Nacional
Revolucionario(MNR)leaders fought against the Bolivian military and the mining
39

oligarchies to overthrow the government. The MNR established universal suffrage.
The Bolivian political environment changed significantly with the increased number of
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voters because it disrupted a previously established political situation by increasing the
number of political parties and forced coalition governments that gave greater power to
smaller parties, fhe MNR adopted the Petroleum Code of 1955, which created a co
existence between Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos(YPFB)and foreign
investors. The 1967 Constitutional Assembly that declared all hydrocarbons as state
property is an example of the immediate consequences. This change was the catalyst for
the enactment of the 1969 nationalization of the Bolivian Gulf Oil Company that led in
1972 to a new hydrocarbons law, which created a virtual state monopoly, with foreign
companies restricted to exploration and production.
Hydrocarbons have been at the center of political debate for the entirety of modem
Bolivian history. There are two differing schools of thought on hydrocarbons: that they
are to be managed in the best manner to maximize profits, or that they are the “focal point
of economic nationalism, a resource to be jealously maintained under state control to
» >?40

ensure that the benefits from oil and natural gas accrue to the ‘people’.

Different

Bolivian governments have experimented with the two separate hydrocarbon
management ideologies.
Natural gas eventually surpassed petroleum as the most important export during the
Paz Estenssoro government in 1985. He issued Presidential Decree 21060, which took
stringent steps to open the economy to foreign direct investment, attack inflation, restore
fiscal responsibility, reduce the size of the government and provide the private sector
41

with broad incentives to invest.

These economic policies were continued by President
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Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993). Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (1993-1997; 2002-2003)
broadened them with the 1996 Hydrocarbon law, which allowed a foreign company to
control up to 50% of a hydrocarbon company and reduced the percentage of profits
foreign companies paid to the state. After liberalizing the hydrocarbon industry, there
were drastic increases in investment and proven and potential oil and gas reserves.
Proven oil reserves increased by 319% from 1997 to 2003; proven natural gas reserves
rose by 306% from 1996 to 2004. Investments increased by 504% from 1996 to 1998
and averaged $475 million a year from 1998-2002. The contribution of natural gas to the
Bolivian Gross Domestic Product(GDP)rose by 38% from 1990 to 2002, and in 2004,
42

taxes and fees related to natural gas constituted some 37% of overall tax revenues.
The increase in international investment allowed Sanchez de Lozada’s government
to expand from serving national needs to becoming an international supplier of natural
gas. His plan to amplify foreign investment was to amend Decree 21060 to allow foreign
firms to participate in all areas of industry—from exploration to the retail of
hydrocarbons. Bolivia looked to Brazil to develop their international presence. With the
rapid industrialization of Brazil, it chose to collaborate with Bolivia on the GASBOL
project, the construction of a pipeline from Bolivia to Brazil, with a twenty-year contract
for natural gas. Bolivia rekindled its partnership with Argentina to supply the country
with natural gas. At the end of the Sanchez de Lozada tenure, the Bolivian hydrocarbons
industry positioned itself to be the natural gas center for the entire Southern Cone.
In 2000, the pendulum of Bolivian politics swung back toward economic
nationalism with hydrocarbons taking the central role in debates during the presidencies
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of Hugo Banzer (1997-2001) and Jorge Quiroga (2001-2002).'^^ Despite the economic
successes during the Sanchez de Lozada tenure, Bolivia experienced an economic
downturn with GDP shrinking and unemployment rising. The economic woes resulted in
protests by the unemployed, especially the indigenous population, centering on the
utilization of natural resources, with many protests headed by Evo Morales. In efforts to
stimulate the economy and promote long-term development, Quiroga met with a group of
foreign investors and formed the Pacific Liquefied Natural Gas Consortium to develop a
44

gas pipeline from Bolivia to a port in Chile to export it to Mexico and the United States.
The economic woes and Pacific LNG Consortium played large roles in the 2002 election
that saw Sanchez de Lozada reelected with 22% of the vote. The persistent tension over
the land dispute from the War of the Pacific with Chile evoked immediate protests from
the lower classes, led by Morales, whose party Movimiento al Socialismo(MAS)
announced in 2003 that it would unleash protests in September to put a stop to the
45

Bolivian government’s plan to sell gas to Chile.
These protests, unified by the slogan ‘Wo al gas, ” were the impetus for the first
Bolivian gas war, \\ hich consisted of two months of continual protests by a small
minority of Bolivians to prevent the Pacific LNG Consortium and remove Sanchez de
Lozada from office. The gas war was not over the sale of natural gas, but over who
would harvest the benefits from the hydrocarbons profits. The government, plagued by
ineffective and slow responses to protests, could not overwhelm the organized protests.
After many violent confrontations between protesters and the Bolivian military, Sanchez
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de Lozada agreed lo temporarily shelve the Pacific LNG Consortium project and submit a
referendum to evaluate the country's hydrocarbon situation. Morales and other protesters
rejected his compromise and Sanchez de Lozada resigned on October 17, 2003, and
Carlos Mesa replaced him.
While protests subsided with the Mesa presidency, hydrocarbons remained the
single foremost issue on the national agenda. In his inaugural address Mesa “referred to
his predecessor's last-minute offer of a referendum on gas by promising to hold a binding
referendum on gas exports, revisit the capitalization of state corporations, and redraft the
-46

hydrocarbons law.

Mesa hoped the referendum would suit the left’s nationalistic

contingency, while maintaining high levels of foreign investment. In May 2004,
Congress passed a hydrocarbons law that “levies an additional 32% tax on oil and gas
production at the wellhead, on top of the existing 18% royalty. The law calls for the
»47

compulsory conversion of existing contracts to the terms of the new law.
Unfortunately, this new hydrocarbon law did not appease either the nationalistic left or
the foreign investors. Consequently, both continued the frequent demonstrations of
discontent.
The left responded with the second gas war that consisted of another wave of
protests demanding the resignation of Carlos Mesa, immediate elections and a
constitutional assembly to revise the constitution. Simultaneously, the wealthy eastern
state of Santa Cruz called for a referendum to expand regional autonomy, in an effort to
preserve their agreement to receive natural gas royalties. Mesa could not handle the
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protests, so he resigned in June 2005, Eduardo Rodriguez was appointed interim
president until elections were held in December 2005.
Indigenous Histor>^ and the Rise of Evo Morales
Throughout the gradual development of Bolivian democracy and the effects of
natural resource privatization, the indigenous population continued to become more
politically active, w hich culminated in the popular election of Evo Morales, Bolivia and
Latin America's first democratically elected indigenous president in 2005 with 54% of
the popular vote. As a youth. Morales was active fighting for indigenous rights and
representation. Morales joined a union of coca growers in 1981. In 1985, he was elected
general secretary. After the U.S. encouraged Bolivia to legislate the eradication of coca
in the late 1980s, Morales led a 600 mile march from Cochabamba to La Paz that resulted
48

in him being jailed,

Morales continued to harass the Bolivian government and

remained active in the political process because of his leading role with the Cochabamba
coca union.
In 1995, the first year that all Bolivian municipalities held elections, indigenous
representatives were elected to “29% of the seats(464 ofthe 1,624) in 200
„49

municipalities.

Morales was part of a group of farmers and indigenous people who

united to form the Asamblea de Soberania de los Pueblos(ASP)to protest the effects of
the neoliberal reforms enacted by Sanchez de Lozada. The National Election Court did
not recognize the newly formed ASP party, so they ran under the banner of the Izquierda
Unida (lU), a coalition of leftist parties. To prevent legal difficulties. Morales created the
MAS party, “an indigenous-based political party that calls for the nationalization of
48
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industry, legalization of the coca leaf(the main ingredient of cocaine) and fairer
-50

distribution of national resources.

Since its creation, the MAS party steadily gained

power throughout the region and eventually the nation by mobilizing the indigenous
population along with other left-of-center unions. Morales and his party benefited from
the polarizing policies of Sanchez de Lozada. These actions made a large contribution to
the decline of the traditional party, especially the MNR,‘‘while fostering a dramatic
„5l

increase in the number of locally sponsored parties.

Morales led the political party,

with this unusual conglomerate of political ideologies which “[behaved] more like a
»52

union than a party and [drew] much of its strength from attacking the party system.
The Morales-led MAS party received 20% of the popular vote that resulted in 26 seats in
Congress and membership in the Senate. Morales finished second in the presidential
elections in 2002.
Morales and the MAS continued to gain recognition after the 2002 election success.
After the election of Sanchez de Lozada, the First Gas War occurred and it succeeded in
forcing his resignation. Under serious pressure. Vice President Carlos Mesa put the issue
of hydrocarbon nationalization to a referendum vote on July 18, 2004; the results
demonstrated a majority approval of all questions on the referendum and eventually
53

resulted in the approval of the Hydrocarbons Law of 2005 by the Bolivian Congress.
This law created the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH)that stipulated that a certain
percentage of revenues be distributed among departments, municipalities, universities

50

America Vera-Zavala. “Evo Morales Has Plans for Bolivia.” New York Times, 18 Dec 2005. (1)
Peter DeShazo. “Bolivia at the Crossroads.” Foreign Service Journal April 2006. 57.
52
Eduardo Gamarra. “Political Parties since 1964: The Construction of Bolivia’s Multiparty System.
Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective. Eds. M. Grindle and P. Domingo.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. (290).
51
See Appendix A
51

28

guaranteeing trade unionist rights, nationalizing the hydrocarbon industry and calling a
constitutional assembly. To satisfy his campaign promises, one of the immediate
measures taken by Morales was to eut his salary by 57% and members ofthe executive
and legislatives branches recei\ ed similar deductions in order to fund 6,000 new teachers
56

and a 7% teacher pay raise in 2006.

He also passed the Law of Trade Unions,“to

defend the rights of workers in this country who feel exploited by labor deregulation.
With the defense of trade unions, the workers of this country will have their rights
.^57

protected.

Although he enacted those two laws, he did not follow through on his

promise to triple the minimum wage, an action that immediately caused many ultra58

leftists groups to chastise him and accuse him of appealing to the neoliberalist camp.
To better his relations with his constituents. Morales and MAS attempted to use
patronage to “buy the support of significant peasant and indigenous organizations, as well
,,59

as workers’ unions.

Consistently in his tenure, he has used anti-U.S. rhetoric to gamer

support for his policies, which has worked in the short-run. Like Hugo Chavez, Morales
is advocating similar 2U* century socialism to mobilize indigenous groups and the
working and peasant classes and to shun neoliberal policies and pursue social justice.
During his first 100 days, his popularity was shrinking. On May I, 2006, which
coincided on a holiday celebrating worker’s struggles. Morales announced a decree
nationalizing natural hydrocarbon resources and declared that the State acquired
ownership, possession and total control of them. This declaration was more political than
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economic. Public opinion of Morales increased after the announcement, which helped
give "a boost to pro-Morales candidates in the election for the constituent assembly- ●an
all-important step in what could be an attempt to consolidate power by changing the rules
of the political game.

..60

Morales campaigned on the platform that the state should call for a 100 percent
recovery of hydrocarbons. Upon his election, the process to renegotiate new contracts
with hydrocarbon companies had not occurred. In the face of declining popularity, he
issued ‘‘an executive decree declaring ‘the nationalization of natural hydrocarbons
resources in the country’ with the state ‘recovering the possession and total and absolute
control of those resources.

..61

To pay for the additional costs that YPFB would incur.

Morales imposed an additional 32% tax on the income obtained from larger scale natural
gas fields,

62

Now YPFB “would take a majority stake in all natural gas projects. In

addition, private companies would assume a new role under an operating service
agreement structure, whereby they would produce natural gas on behalf of YPFB for a
fee.

,,63

The new tax on companies allows the government to take up to 65% of gross

sales for small fields and over 75% for larger fields, which is much higher than the
industry average.

64

Morales’ strong statements and stance on hydrocarbons, while

celebrated domestically, drew international complaints for fear of his radical and
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and indigenous groups. Despite the new law giving greater economic power to the state,
Morales continued to protest that it was not a full nationalization of the hydrocarbon
industry. These protests turned into the Second Gas War, which caused Mesa to resign
prematurely from his presidency and Bolivia held presidential elections in December of
2005.
In the 2005 election, w hich was highly contested due to budding controversy
concerning the diminishing role of foreign investors within the natural gas and petroleum
industries and the extent of implementation of coca eradication, Morales chose to run
again representing the MAS party. He won with an outright majority of 54%.^"* During
his campaign, Morales campaigned for increasing indigenous representation, holding a
constitutional assembly, nationalizing the hydrocarbon sector, diminishing extreme
poverty and gaining independence to grow coca. Morales’ policies call for a serious
increase in public-sector jobs (focusing on the state hydrocarbon corporation).
Considering diminishing foreign investment, he is required to favor fiscal discipline and
limited government spending. Unfortunately, these two policies are incompatible unless
the state incurs serious “political sacrifice (charging and collecting income tax, lowering
subsidies, halting contraband, fighting corruption, increasing domestic fuel prices) or
»55

stimulating exports, especially in the hydrocarbon sector.

Confronted with these

options. Morales has chosen to try to stimulate exports, focusing on hydrocarbons.
Social and Hydrocarbon Agenda under Morales
Since assuming the presidency. Morales has focused on achieving his immediate
campaign promises of increasing salai*ies, implementing “21^^ century socialism,”
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potentially unstable new policies. Morales’ decree only reversed the changes Sanchez de
Lozada made while “capitalizing” YPFB in 1996.
While achieving greater domestic support, the policies did not turn out to be as
disruptive as imagined. They changed the environment of the hydrocarbon industr}' with
the transition from private control to YPFB control. In attempts to comply with his first
180-day time table. Morales took a more accommodating approach. Now international
companies were still able to protect their key investments without long-term financial
commitments. The short-term gains were significant for Morales, but in terms of
investment, international investment in 2006, which was negative $238.6 million in 2005,
was $240.1 million dollars (2.2% of GDP), but that low percentage of international
investment is not sufficient to sustain Morales’ prediction of a 7% annual growth.^^ After
the nationalizations, foreign companies are not required to invest in exploration projects
because YPFB solely funds them.
Morales has taken a more conciliatory approach with international customers.
Argentina signed a significant long-term contract for natural gas on October 18,2006 that
consists of a new 20-year deal with Bolivia that triples the export volume and sells gas at
66

a benchmark price of $5 per million Btu.

Brazil and Petrobras account for generating
67

18% of Bolivia’s GDP and purchase 70% of Bolivia’s natural gas.

Bolivia considered

nationalizing all of Petrobras’ hydrocarbon interest in Bolivia with limited negotiation.
which made Brazil reconsider their investor relationship. Bolivia rectified the situation
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and Brazil “agreed lo pay higher prices for Bolivian gas—and also decided to move full
v68

speed ahead on [an infrastructure project],

Morales’ milder approach toward

international customers has resulted in increased economic gains that will provide the
increased revenue lo allow him to pursue his political and social aims.
Before the May 1 nationalization decree, revenue from natural gas royalties and
taxes were $600 million in 2005, but in 2006, the country received $1.6 billion.^^ The
revenue from oil and natural gas climbed to 13.3% of GDP in 2006 from 5% in 2004,
while total revenues from the combined public sector increased from 27.5% of GDP in
70

2004 to 40.2% in 2006.

Specifically in the state of Santa Cruz, which produces almost

half of Bolivia's tax revenues, the government has had a $500 million revenue windfall
71

profit after exerting more government control,

Their economy is predicted to grow

more than 4% in 2007 and Morales has used these increased profits the social aspect of
72

his political platform.
Morales can promote his social and political goals through utilizing the additional
revenue derived from the new hydrocarbon situation. Morales’ May 1 declaration helped
give MAS control of the Assembly, but did not give it a carte blanche because many
constitutional amendments require two-thirds majority vote. Morales is trying to
actualize his campaign promises of enshrining indigenous rights, recognizing the right of
communal property and upholding the nationalization of the hydrocarbon sector by
rewriting the constitution. The main dispute is over money with the natural gas laden
68
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eastern Bolivia trying to preserve its regional autonomy to continue receiving a
percentage of natural gas royalties for its municipalities, while impoverished western
Bolivia wants greater hydrocarbon revenue.
The IDH helped the municipalities because the tax was distributed to those areas
that produced hydrocarbons instead of those regionally that economically need it and
political supported him. Responding to the inequality of the IDH and to promote his
political agenda. Morales proposed in October 2007 to change the retirement program
BonoSoI with Renta Dignidad that would expand eligibility to citizens beginning at age
*^3

sixty and would increase the amount of the benefit from about $225 to $300 per year.
He intended to finance the petition with a 30% cut ofIDH funds from municipalities,
departments and universities. He wanted to legally reduce the IDH to prevent money
returning to the wealthier regions in the country and have more capital to further develop
his political platform. Since he could not legislate a change, he enacted Supreme Decree
29322 on October 24, 2006 that increased “the portion ofIDH funds to municipalities
from 34.5% to 67%, while decreasing the departmental share from 56.9% to 24.4%.
Combined with the 30% cut to fund the Renta Dignidad, this amounts to more than a
,,74

60% cut in IDH resources available to the departmental governments.

The changes to

IDH have created both vertical and horizontal distribution inequalities. Now because a
high percentage of the IDH tax goes to municipalities, those in departments with smaller
populations receive more per capita benefits than those in departments with larger
populations. In terms of horizontal inequality, the national government continually runs a
budget deficit(while receiving 29% of the IDH), but departments and municipalities
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‘‘have not been able to spend all of the oil and gas revenues allocated to them and have a
-73

surplus of $650 million.
Strong opposition has put the constitutional assembly in a stalemate by protesting
constitutional amendments such as changing the capital from La Paz to Sucre, fortifying
the nationalizations to include minerals, eliminating presidential term limits and
certifying the land redistribution process. Both sides have participated in violent protests,
but ultimately the Assembly must reconvene and concede to have any constitutional
changes. The strong political opposition has forced Morales to take a more moderate
political stance from his electoral platform to try to lessen tension with the opposition.
Bolivia’s GDP has increased from $173 million in 2002 to $1.57 billion in 2007
because of increasing the royalties from hydrocarbons production.^^ This has permitted
Morales to write off Bolivia’s debt with foreign lenders and to create a 6% budget
surplus, allowing him “to move ahead with social welfare programs like one that provides
,77

poor families with a modest stipend if their children remain in school,

While poverty

rates are not drastically dropping (63.1% in 2003 to 59.9% in 2006), Morales is heavily
supporting a national literacy campaign, improved health policies, increased annuity
program for retirees, an anti-malnutrition program and prodigious land reform and land
titling program. The literacy campaign of“Lb, si puedo,"started in 2006 aimed to
significantly reduce illiteracy by 2008. By July 2007, it had reached over 500,000 of the
78

1,200,000 illiterate Bolivians.

This program is unique because it also gives Spanish

speakers the opportunity to learn Quechua and Aymara. Morales has focused a majority
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of his tenure toward ameliorating the standard of living of the Bolivians of the lowest
79

economic group, those who elected him.
1 he Boli\ ian government has made significant plans to use the increased revenues,
but has not implemented much on a national scale. Since Morales has taken power,the
hydrocarbon revenue has increased by 26% in real terms in comparison with the same
80

period in 2005.

The Morales government has concentrated the utilization ofthe

hydrocarbon revenue toward achieving the social aspects of his election promises.
Unlike previous governments that ‘Tailed to use revenues to improve the lives of Bolivian
people in areas like health and education,’' Morales is using the revenues wisely.

On a

national scale. Morales has only enacted Renta Dignidad and a program called the
Juancito Pinto Stipend that gives about $25 a year to the families of each child enrolled
in primary school. Morales centers his and MAS’s political future on retaining popular
support by proper utilization of the revenue of Bolivia’s natural resources and
sporadically using anti-neoliberal “outbursts...that the populist leader [uses] to show the
»82

Bolivian people that he is prepared to stand up to multinational giants.
Many of Morales' political aspirations are repressed due to an uncooperative
political environment, which has forced him to take a more moderate political path. After
fighting for many years to guarantee the representation of different left-of-center and
indigenous groups within the government. Morales’ more moderate approach has caused
some of the more radical groups that had supported him to protest against him; in the
same way they protested to remove Sanchez de Lozada. The government expects to
79
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continue to receive large revenues from windfall profits, but the political division within
the eountry looks to postpone or prevent any possibility of legitimizing Morales’ political
and social policies by rewriting the constitution. Without political consensus, the unequal
and illogical distribution system of hydrocarbon revenues will not be able to efficiently
utilize these revenues. His practice of 21^* century socialism, with the land redistribution
and restructuring of the hydrocarbon sector, is much more moderate than the same policy
that Chavez espouses. The process of rewriting the constitution, which hopes to cement
indigenous rights, has created greater ethnic and regional division. Although changing
the hydroearbons law has provided capital to fund new social programs and bought him
time politically, unless he pacifies protests and minimizes regional and ethnic conflicts he
will never be able to achieve his long-term goals.
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Chapter Three: Case Study of Venezuela
Since his coup attempi in 1992, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez launched
himself into the political spotlight. His election in 1998 established him as a political
outsider determined to make a serious impact on social policies, specifically in efforts to
improve the standard of living of the lower-income citizens. Despite political instability,
Chavez plans to capitalize on the rapidly increasing price of oil to help develop the
country economically and social. He hopes to spread his political ideology and increase
regional integration against the United States by utilizing the growing importance of oil.
Historical Background of Venezuela
Before Christopher Colombus’ encounter of Venezuela and European
colonization in the sixteenth century, the vast reserves of petroleum have been evident to
the indigenous people of the region through natural seepages of crude petroleum who
used it to repair their canoes. Yet, from the independence movement of Simon Bolivar to
the age of caudillismo this natural resource was not utilized until the dictatorship of Juan
Vicente Gomez(1931-1935), who began the trend of using these profits for
modernization and societal improvement measures. Venezuelan governments oscillated
between the military dictatorships Lopez Contreras(1936-1941), Isaias Medina(19411945) and Perez Jimenez(1952-1958)to reformist governments such as Betancourt s
(1945-1948). After the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, the foundations of
Latin America’s longest democracy were laid with the election of Betancourt.
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The Betancourt presidency formed the Pacto de Punto Fijo (Pact of Punto Fijo),
which was a pre-electoral agreement by the leaders of theTcddw Democrdtica(AD),
Comite de Organizacion Politico Electoral Independente(COPEI)and the Union
Repuhlicana Democrdtica(URD)parties to support the winner of the election and to
form a coalition government. While the Pact of Punto Fijo ensured democratic stability
and power sharing among the largest parties, it prevented the Communist Party and other
left-of-center parties from participating. The smaller URD party became minimized,
which resulted in an alternation of political power between the AD and COPEI. Over
time, this political arrangement produced a rigid political environment characterized by
political apathy among the entire population until the election of Hugo Chavez Frias in
83

1998.

Despite democratic stability during this period, the Venezuelan government was
84

subject to Dutch Disease,

Venezuela has not sufficiently developed its non-oil

industries because of the intense focus on the oil industry, which has led to grave levels
85

of poverty that reached 70%, in 1995.

Venezuela remains highly dependent on oil

revenues, which account for roughly 90% of export earnings, more than 50% of the
86

federal revenue and around 30% of GDP.
History of Petroleum in Venezuela

Since Venezuela began exporting petroleum in 1912, the economy has based itself
on this natural resource. In 1929, Venezuela was the world’s second largest producer of
oil and the world’s largest exporter; within fifteen years, oil’s share of exports went from
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1.9% to 91.2%.

From the outset, the production of oil became the primary emphasis in

Venezuela, which ad\ ersely affected the development of the non-oil industry. As the
Gomez government began relying more on oil income, it was divided by conflicting
demands because “on the one hand, it sought to increase its revenues, for which it
required the development of its regulatory capacity and of a legitimizing national
discourse. Yet [the Gomez government had] an extremely narrow social base. It neither
sought, nor could it afford, to antagonize the oil companies, and it remained highly
..88

responsive to their pressures.

Beginning in the Gomez administration, the practice of

appeasing a particular social class and the consideration of the interests ofthe oil
companies became prevalent in Venezuelan politics.
The Gomez government, with the political support and financial resources
provided by oil revenues and international oil companies, appeased the external political
factors and strengthened the presidency, which resulted in “political and administrative
»89

unification and the first sustained political stability since independence in 1821.
Venezuelans saw oil as their means to reach modernity and they considered it the
property of the people. In 1943, the Hydrocarbons Act was passed to increase the state s
income from the oil industry by contracting a higher royalty and instituting an income tax
on the oil sector. Attempting to stimulate non-oil industry, President Medina required
foreign companies to build refineries to diversify the economy with industrialization.
The Hydrocarbon Act transformed Venezuela into an oil nation because it declared
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subsoil oil national property and charged the state to safeguard and use its profits for
90

state-promoted economic development.
In the 1950s, the price of oil in the world market decreased. Venezuela, along
with the world's other main oil exporting countries, formed the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC)in 1960. OPEC was able to regulate the quantity
and price of oil produced by the major oil producers to ensure the market did not become
oversaturated. OPEC helped the Venezuelan government capitalize on the increase in the
world price of oil by controlling a majority of the world supply. During the 1972-1974
Middle East oil embargo, world oil prices and Venezuelan revenues quadrupled.
President Carlos Andres Perez(1974-1979; 1989-1993)formulated ‘Va Gran Venezuela
to stimulate development by combating poverty via price controls and income increases
coupled with the nationalization of the oil industry, creating Petroleos de Venezuela,
Sociedad Anoninm (PD VSA)in 1976. Foreign oil companies did little to resist the
nationalization process because previously Venezuelan governmental control was such
that companies had “only a regulated profit. For the last two years before nationalization,
for every dollar of oil exports, the government collected 80 cents in rents, royalties and
taxes.

,91

The nationalization was in name only because PDVSA frequently ignored

governmental mandates and only transferred ownership of the industry to the state
without changing management or work culture.
The rapidly devaluing price of oil in 1983 evoked a currency crisis in Venezuela
and Latin America causing the central government to implement a currency exchange
control. Governmental programs became dependent on PDVSA’s investment reserves.
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responsive to their pressures.
Beginning in the Gomez administration, the practice of
appeasing a particular social class and the consideration of the interests of the oil
companies became prevalent in Venezuelan politics.
The Gomez government, with the political support and financial resources
provided by oil revenues and international oil companies, appeased the external political
factors and strengthened the presidency, which resulted in “political and administrative
unification and the first sustained political stability since independence in 1821.”^^
Venezuelans saw oil as their means to reach modernity and they considered it the
property of the people. In 1943, the Hydrocarbons Act was passed to increase the state’s
income from the oil industry by contracting a higher royalty and instituting an income tax
on the oil sector. Attempting to stimulate non-oil industry, President Medina required
foreign companies to build refineries to diversify the economy with industrialization.
The Hydrocarbon Act transformed Venezuela into an oil nation because it declared
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The Board of Directors at PDVSA wanted to protect their company from the government,
so they opened PDVSA to international companies and investors. Due to the ideological
dichotomy between the government and directors of PDVSA,the nationalization ofthe
oil industry never materialized in the 1980s. During this period, petroleum booms
allowed for governmental expansion because of increased revenues during the Campms
tenure (1979-1984); petroleum busts plagued the Lusinchi government(1984-1989)
causing a recession and limiting social development spending.
With the declining petrodollars, the economic woes continued under Perez s
second term as president. He campaigned on maintaining distance from international
lending organizations. When elected he announced El Gran Viraje(The Great
Turnaround) that constituted shifting toward an open economy and accepting IMF
conditional loans, which removed the state’s multifaceted system of protections (e.g.
loans, subsidies, price controls, state employment, etc.). He raised the subsidized price of
domestic gasoline. Venezuelans rioted because “the measure shattered the bond that
united the body politics the collective owner of the nation’s natural body; by violating
what the people considered their birthright, it ruptured a moral bond of protection
»92

between state and people,

Perez reacted to the riots, called El Caracazo, by using

military and police forces to crush them and the death toll was “an)^here between 300
93

and 3,000 dead”.

The importance of petroleum and the populistic tendencies by

previous governments to ensure citizens had low-cost access to it was underestimated by
the regime.

Fernando Coronil. (376).
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The Perez government was followed by Caldera(1994-1999) but there were
limited politieal changes. The economy and the population continued to struggle to
regain the progress of the 1970s oil booms with no avail. The lack of petrodollars could
not support Caldera's platform to improve the standard of living and deviate away from
94

neoliberal reforms.

In desperate need of economic stimulus, he looked to the IMF

again. The economic reform package was intended increase the standard of living ofthe
lower classes, who were afflicted by hyperinflation and lived in poverty. The neoliberal
reforms enacted in the 1990s did not help Venezuela modernize. They created a twoclass society with a small, elite class and a large, lower class. The government continued
to rely upon petrodollars to fund government programs, which minimized the
development of other industries and resulted in greater national poverty because the
petroleum industry only employs “less than 2% of the economically active population,
95

[while] it produces nearly 90% of the foreign exchange entering the country .

Dutch

Disease in the 1990s set the stage for a political outsider to be elected on a national scale.
The Rise of Hugo Chavez
During his tenure in the Venezuelem military, Hugo Chavez formed the Ejercito
Bolivariano Revolucionario‘200(EBR-200)in response to the corruption of the social
and political system. After seeing the high death tolls and governmental repression in El
Caracazo^ more soldiers joined the EBR-200 and Chavez began making plans for a coup
d’etat. On February 4, 1992, Chavez unsuccessfully launched the coup. Chavez gained
national attention when he gave a one-minute speech on national television taking
responsibility for the rebellion and saying that the revolution had only failed ''por ahora
Coronil.(384).
Roberto Bricefto-Le6n.
(2005): 1-23. (2).
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(for now). He represented an alternative to the rigid political structure that, in the minds
of the country's poor and left, caused the economic decline. The coup was legitimate to
the poor and left-of-center Venezuelans because they disagreed with the 1992
government. Cha\ ez ser\ ed two years in prison for the coup attempt. During his time in
prison, the political party Causa R gained notoriety because it campaigned to represent an
alternative to the Pact of Punto Fijo and their candidate Andres Velasquez finished fourth
in the presidential election. Causa R was the first legitimate challenge to the Punto Fijo
System because it took advantage of the large number of disenfranchised poor and gained
96

the support of the labor unions,

Following the 1993 elections, Causa R did not

maintain its internal organization and lost its political influence in the following years.
After Chavez was released from prison in 1994, he reorganized the EBR-200 into
the political party Movimiento V[Quinta]Republica(MVR). The MVR used the
progress of Causa R in the 1993 elections as a springboard to unite the lower and middle
class citizens. Chavez was able to capitalize on the disenchanted lower and middle class
voters by presenting himself as political outsider. The MVR,allied with the smaller
socialist, communist and labor union parties, won the December 1998 election in the first
round with 56.2% of the vote. Chavez campaigned with the platform of ending the Pact
of Punto Fijo, eliminating political corruption, eradicating poverty and creating a new
constitution. While politically he could dismantle the Punto Fijo system, his political
platform depended on attempting to “link oil nationalism and economic development to a
97

concept of democracy” to achieve its different goals.
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Venezuela and the Petroleum Industry under Chavez
Upon assuming the presidency in February 1999, Chavez began to enact his
promised political platform despite Congressional opposition and a fixed budget by the
legislature. To counter these obstacles, Chavez sought help from the military to combat
poverty by creating Plan Bolivar 2000 in February 1999. This plan involved a civilianmilitary relationship that implemented an anti-poverty campaign with consisting of doorto-door vaccinations, rural infrastructure projects, food distribution and education
improvements. This policy tried to help develop non-oil industries that “had stagnated
since 1978, with only occasional, sluggish, and short-lived interludes of growth [since
„98

then].

To prevent problems associated with a limited fiscal budget while paying for

the necessary supplies for Plan Bolivar 2000, the Chavez government’s “priority [has
»99

been] increasing oil revenues to previous levels to avoid an economic disaster,

From

the beginning of his presidency, the Chavez government linked its economic and social
development policy to his oil policy.
He also immediately called for a referendum vote on creating a constitutional
assembly. The April 19, 1999 referendum was passed resoundingly and two months later
the election of the members of the constitutional assembly occurred, which because of
Chavez’s overwhelming popularity 95%,or 125 of 131 representatives were allied with
100

his political project.

The new constitution changed the name ofthe country to the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, established the possibility of four types of
referendums, altered the political structure to having five instead of three governmental
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branches (legislature, executive,judiciary, electoral and citizen) and it also increased the
presidential term to six years and allowed immediate reelection. The new constitution
succeeded in diminishing the old elite’s power by requiring mega-elections to be held to
lOI

re-legitimate elected officials,

Chavez ensured that PDVSA would remain in the hands

of the government by creating .Article 303 that stated, “for reasons of economic and
political sovereignty and of national strategy, the state will maintain the totality of the
»102

shares of PDVSA or of the entity created to manage the oil industry.

From a social

and economic perspective, the new constitution recognized and promoted indigenous
rights and allocated a larger role of the state in the economy,such as the right to
employment, food, shelter and health care. The constitution included the “state’s
commitment to abolish latifundios (large and idle landed estates) and the prohibition to
103

privatize the state oil company.

These inclusions increased the tangible power of the

Venezuelan population to play a direct role in the development of the country.
The first two years of the Chavez presidency had oil revenues increase from $6
billion to $11 billion. Despite this increased revenue, there were no distinctive political
or social policies that differed from his predecessors.

He was reelected on July 30,

2000 with 59.8% of the vote in the first round of elections.
After his election, Chavez increased his political efforts on the needs of the poor
(those who elected him) by focusing on improving social factors via economic
stimulation and growth. He centered his policies on fiscal sustainability by increasing oil
prices and industry taxes, and non-oil revenues. He has concentrated on reducing
101
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economic volatility and internalizing the oil production. The implemented exchange
controls have been successful in keeping capital within the country and helping develop
the non-oil sectors of the economy, whose revenues have grown from $14 billion in 1999
to $20 billion in 2005, yet they dropped to $10 billion and $14 billion during the years of
crisis.

105

While the Chavez government has been successful in generating non-oil

revenue by macroeconomic policy initiatives for economic development, the non-oil
sector is still highly dependent upon the oil industry for providing the capital for
investment.
Chavez did not accomplish many of his drastic social goals because the economy
was adversely affected by internal political instability during the first two years after his
election. After the September 11^*^ terrorist attack, the price of oil decreased and the
global economy contracted. This forced the government to cut back on spending by at
106

least 10% and the effects were immediately noticed with unemployment figures rising.
There was resistance from the more conservative oil company in response to the
Hydrocarbons Law, which raised royalties on oil exploration by foreign companies.
These two events led to an organized coup in April 2002 that saw Chavez removed from
power for forty-seven hours. After the coup, Chavez reinstated the former board of
directors and managers of PD VSA before the Hydrocarbons Law and reevaluation of the
industry, which he hoped would pacify the oil industry and guarantee greater economic
stability. Chavez’s opposition united against him again and shut down the oil industry in
early December 2002 until February 2003, which plunged the economy into a severe
recession. Venezuela lost 24% of its GDP and the economy did not recovery until late in
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Source: Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Finanzas

Soon after taking greater control of PDVSA,Chavez announced the creation of
the Bolivarian Missions, a series of anti-poverty, educational and social welfare programs
that were implemented via presidential decree in 2003. Missions Robinson, Ribas and
Sucre were all created to help support continual education and literacy programs for
adults and were coupled with the creation of Bolivarian elementary, high school and
universities throughout the nation. After universalizing health care in the 1999
Constitution, the introduction of Mission Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood)
focuses on urban healthcare and Mission Vuelvan Caras(About Face)seeks to improve
social development through community involvement.
110
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Poverty reduction is one of the central planks of Chavez’s social improvement
platform, but implementing programs to combat poverty has greatly depended upon
political stability. There was slow, gradual progress in the reduction of the percentage of
households living in poverty from 1998-2001. From 2002-2003, there was political
instability due to the opposition oil strike, which raised the poverty rate because the
unemployment rate rapidly increased. Since economic stability has returned to the
country, the poverty rate has been consistently dropping. The poverty rate does not
consider increased access to health care or education that the poor have experienced.

Ibid.

50

2007
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which is estimated to lower the measured poverty rate by about two percentage points.
1 he poverty rate decrease can be attributed to greater economic investment and a better
utilization of revenues by the government in social development programs. The
governmental programs implemented to battle poverty through greater education, literacy
and endogenous social investment have been successful, yet they are all long-term
113

poverty reduction programs that cannot be solely responsible for combating poverty.
According to the research by Ravaillon and Chen (1997), who found the income elasticity
114

of poverty reduction rate to be 2.6, but under Chavez it is 2.24 points,

Once the

economic growth during since 1998 is considered, it is evident that the Chavez
government has been less efficient in converting GDP growth into poverty reduction.
This inefficiency lies with the heavy governmental dependence on oil prices(which have
grown from $10.57 per barrel in 1998 to $117.60 in April 2008), but the overall poverty
reduction is explained because poverty rates commonly decline with economic growth.
Chavez created the Robinson, Ribas and Sucre Missions to directly target adult
education, specifically literacy rates. The first program, Robinson, started with hundreds
115

of Cuban literacy experts training over 100,000 literacy teachers,

The government has

increased social spending on education, which was 3.1% of GDP in 1998 and 5.1% of
GDP in 2006. As indicated by Figure 3, there were significant improvements in the gross
enrollment rates for preschool, basic education, secondary, profession and higher
education from the time Chavez took power and also specifically under the Bolivarian
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Missions program. During his presidency, the literacy rates have improved, giving
Venezuela one of the highest literacy rates in the region. While there have been social
gains from the Missions program, a recent report published by the former chiefeconomist
of the Venezuelan National Assembly Francisco Rodriguez indicated that the social gains
were overstated in the official statistics. Chavez claimed to have taught 1.5 million to
read and write making the illiteracy rate 0.1%; nongovernmental sources cite the
116

illiteracy rate at 5.6% in 2005, a relatively modest decline from the 2003 rate of6.5%.
The government has spent an average of $1000 per citizen who became literate with
Mission Robinson, compared to about $60 per graduate in other Latin American literacy
1 17

programs.
Figure 3:
Education Improvement in Venezuela since 1998
% Overall
1998
2003
2006
Change
Gross Enrollment Rate for
44.7%
55.1%
60.6%
35.6%
Preschool Education
Gross School Enrollment Rate in
99.5%
89.7%
97.8%
10.9%
Basic Education
Gross School Enrollment Rate in
27.3%
35.9%
41.0%
50.9%
Secondary and Professional
Education
Gross Enrollment Rate in Higher
Education

24.8%

10.0%
1.7%

14.2%

37.9%

16.7%

Beneficiary Population of School
252284
793176
1815597
619.7%
Food Program (started in 1999)
91.1%
93.5%
94.4%
3.6%
Literacy Rate
Source: Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Educacidn

128.9%

29.3%

34.2%

% Change
2003-2006

1.0%

In terms of social welfare, the Bolivarian Missions have made a significant impact
through Barrio Adentro, VueIvan Caras and the Bolivarian technical universities. With
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Barrio Adeiuro. almost 17.000 new doctors(13,000 from Cuba)have begun practicing in
118

impoverished areas of Venezuela since 1998.

The program has shown impressive

results with infant mortality rates decreasing and the number of patients being treating
I h)

rapidly increasing.

rhe program still needs to deal with long-term financing. While

social spending on health has increased from 1.36% to 2.25% of the GDP,the majority of
120

support is provided by oil revenues, so if oil prices decrease, then so does the funding.
Since the Bolivarian Missions were created by presidential decree, their funding relies
solely on windfall oil revenue. Also funded through PDVSA profits, Vuelvan Caras
supports the endogenous sustainable development program through creating about
300,000 Jobs to attempt to make the different Bolivarian Missions programs self
121

By creating technical universities, the government is increasing technical

sustaining.

jobs that couple with their vertical integration projects of the oil industry, such as the
production of their own refinery pipes. These programs have been successful in their
immediate aims, but they are still dependent upon oil revenues for their operation, which
does not help promote the development of the non-oil sector.
A seemingly contradictory notion of the Chavez social strategy is the heavily
subsidized domestic gasoline prices. In April 2007, unleaded gasoline prices were $0.19,
122

while the international world prices per gallon were $3.15.

The costs of subsidizing

gasoline in 2004 were equivalent to the entire budget of the Ministry of Health during the
123

same year.

Considering the revolts that occurred in 1989 when the price of gasoline
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was increased, it is understandable for the sake of political stability why Chavez does not
increase the prices, but the subsidy is limited in the degree of its effectiveness because it
only affects those who use automobiles who are often his opponents.
Chavez wanted to insure he would have significant political impact regardless of
the legislative situation so he modified the Macro-Economic Stabilization Fund(FEM),
which deposits the income from when natural resources prices rose above their five-year
average, so that the fund was not strictly managed by the Central Bank. Previously, the
Central Bank managed the fund conservatively, yet when the prices of oil went up in
2003 and was predicted to continue rising in the near future, Chavez argued to gain
124

greater control of this money and changed the country’s Central Bank law in 2004.

At

the end of 2006, this fund had received almost $20 billion dollars, collecting almost $100
125

million dollars a week from the rapidly increasing world prices of oil.

The director of

the fund, Rodrigo Cabezas, indicated that 70% of the money obtained would be
126

earmarked for infrastructure projects and the other 25% for social spending.

Chavez’s

legislation guarantees him the availability of capital to dedicate to social development.
assuming there are oil profits.
Chavez has rallied internal support by extending his self-identified “21^* century
socialism” in Latin America by using his petroleum wealth to create programs like
PetroCaribe and Banco del Sur(Bank of the South). PetroCaribe is attempting to bypass
U.S. imposed free-trade agreements by providing oil to the Caribbean nations, who are
currently experiencing an energy crisis due to the rapidly increasing prices, in exchange
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of goods and services or with delayed payment options. Under the agreement, Venezuela
covers shipping costs, aids in the development of distribution infrastructure, contributes
to the formation of state-controlled facilities, but it will only deal with state controlled
127

entities, which excludes existing U.S. area distributors from purchasing subsidized oil.
By allowing oil to be exchanged for goods and services, it is hoped that it will boost
public sector development and promote social programs to help the region. Chavez
created the Bank of the South in 2007 to present an alternative to other regional lending
organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB). Unlike the other developmental organization, this
bank prides itself in having “few if any strings” attached in its lending policies that will
promote public and private development along with regional integration products without
128

credit subjected to economic policies.

These programs are examples of how

Venezuelan petro-politics are uniting the region and Chavez supporters against
neoliberalism and presenting an alternative to regional dependence on the United States
and other countries, which is achieving part of Chavez’s goal of creating socialism ofthe
century within Venezuela and the region.
Chavez has focused on improving the economic and social situation of the lower
class. Like past presidents, Chavez has used the abundance of oil revenues to progress
his presidential agenda, but unlike other executives, he has earmarked a greater portion of
the GDP toward social spending. In terms of economic development, the priorities have
been the development of the non-oil sector and providing macroeconomic stability. The
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rapid increase in ihc price of oil has adversely affected the non-oil sector because it has
increased the governmental re\ enue and the windfall profits were redistributed by public
spending (especially to go\ emmental supporters). This caused imports to become
relatively cheaper. I'his change “does not help national production, it works against it.
Non-petroleum exports fall dramatically, and national industrial manufactunng shrinks
-12^

by almost half

rhc government's attempts to promote the agricultural and

manufacturing sectors have been unsuccessful. In 2003, the government set a goal to
raise agriculture's percentage of GNP from 6% to 12% by 2007, but it remains at 6%
Still.
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Oil profits have paid for the heavy subsidizing that has sustained the non-oil

sector. Regarding macroeconomic stability, after the first four turbulent years of political
instability (and relatively lower oil profits) the government has launched programs that
have stabilized Venezuela with a large account surplus and significant foreign reserves,
preparing the nation for the potential of a drop in the price of oil. The Venezuelan
economic condition has been able to successfully prepare for the price of oil to decline
temporarily. It still has not been able to prevent the continuation of Dutch Disease
despite attempts to develop the non-oil sector.
The social aspect of the Chavez administration has been very successful with
noteworthy improvements in poverty reduction, education and social welfare, yet the
money has not been spent efficiently. The effectiveness of reducing poverty is low and
the revenues used to subsidize the price of oil are prohibiting other social spending. All
of these are examples of the inefficient manner of spending in the Chavez government.
The most effective social spending measures have been toward education and health care,
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which in the long run will help decrease the poverty rates. Most social progress has
occurred in the last lour years with the creation of the Bolivarian Missions and greater
economic and political stability. The future of the social programs is not guaranteed
because they are not assured by law, which ‘‘means that they can easily disappear from
one day to the next, as has been the case with past social policies whenever the oil
revenues suddenly dried up, or they can be implemented capriciously, as part of a
-131

political patronage system.

Unless the social policies are legally established, the

Venezuelan population's social benefits will be dependent upon the price of oil.
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Ibid. (147).
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Chapter Four
Presidents ILvo Morales and Hugo Chavez have used similar political strategies to
gain the presidency. Both ha\e advocated progressive social measures while condemmng
neoliberal reforms and hegemonic U.S. influence. While Chavez has had more time to
develop his political platfomi. it is possible to systematically compare and contrast the
two governments in terms of political style and policy preferences before and after their
elections to evaluate the governing ideology in the two countries.
During their presidential campaigns, Chavez and Morales utilized populistic
tactics to rally support. Consider the four characteristics of traditional populism
postulated by Kenneth Roberts:(1) personalistic and paternalistic political leadership
with a(2) diverse, multi-class coalition through (3)top-down political mobilization
garnering support through (4)clientelistic economic projects to build a material
132

foundation for popular support.

During their presidential campaigns both candidates

personified these criteria, using them as a manner to establish themselves as proponents
of a socialist state. The first aspect of a populist leader is “personalistic and paternalistic
133

leadership

which both candidates exemplified during their campaigns. During his

campaign, Chavez relied upon the former members ofthe EBR-2000 to help form the
MVR. He gave charismatic speeches in military regalia, promised drastic social and
economic change, and fashioned himself as the face and the sole leader of the MVR.
After spending years organizing and expanding the Bolivian Cocaleros, Morales
132
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legitimized this mo\ emcnl by unifying different municipal groups under the MAS and
giving it a political presence during his years in the Congress. After finishing a close
second in the 2002 election. Morales continued gaining support through speeches in
indigenous attire demanding that the hydrocarbon industry deserved to be in the hands of
the people and that the indigenous population deserved greater indigenous rights and
representation. Using charismatic speeches, which visually and thematically reinforced
their distance from the ruling elite, established their personalistic leadership. Because
they founded and were the face of their respective political parties demonstrated their
paternalistic leadership.
Roberts' second characteristic of traditional populism is having a “diverse, multi
134

class coalition" applies to the campaign of Chavez, but not to Morales.

After years of

puntofijismo, the majority of the Venezuelan population (excluding the elites who
maintained the power) had lost interest in the political process and Chavez represented an
alternative to this unpopular political situation. Since Venezuela’s inequality as
measured by the GINI coefficient was almost the same in 1997, 0.5, as it was in 1971,
0.45,

Chavez was able to easily amalgamate the large poor sector and the small middle

class sector with his political promises of greater social and economic development
programs. Chavez had to unify multiple sectors of Venezuela to receive enough votes for
victory. Morales, who being indigenous represented over half the population, united the
impoverished facet of the indigenous population, which allowed him to maintain a MASspecific platform to achieve political victory. Morales did not have to create a multi-class
H4
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coalition or a plallbnn that appealed to multiple sectors because his support from the poor
indigenous citizens it was sufficient to win the election,
fhe third characteristic they demonstrate is “top-down political mobilization
● 1 36

gamering support.'

Both candidates exhibited this quality due to previous

governments issuing policies that negatively affected the groups who votes were
mobilized because of them. The Caldera government continued to promote and develop
the neoliberal reforms enacted during the Perez government, which depended on steadily
rising petroleum prices. The petroleum prices did not increase enough to fund the
policies, so the government was not able to increase the standard of living or alleviate
poverty like promised. By criticizing the enacted and unsuccessful neoliberal reforms and
capitalizing on the pessimistic sentiment of previous governments, Chavez was able to
mobilize political support from citizens who wanted drastic change from the current
government. The Morales government benefited from political instability in the previous
governments(Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa). During their governments,there were the
protests of the First and Second Gas Wars that featured many of Morales’ supporters
coming together against the government. Morales maintained the momentum from these
actions to rally supporters of his political platform that helped him win the election in
2005. Chavez and Morales capitalized on the misfortunes of the previous governments to
become the leaders in the mobilization process to gather support from their followers.
The last of Roberts’ criteria of traditional populism is the existence of
»137

“clientelistic economic policies to build a material foundation for popular support.
These were revealed during the campaign promises of both candidates. Chavez promised
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to eradicate po\ crt\, which directly appealed to his voter base, the urban and rural poor.
Although he did not specify the method, this promise did indicate Chavez’s
determination in his campaign to invest in social development projects that would benefit
the population as a whole, but specifically the poorest sectors of the population. Morales
was not so bold to campaign on the elimination of poverty, but he did promise to
diminish extreme poverty. His voter base constituted the majority ofthe population that
lived in extreme poverty. so bv making poverty reduction a central plank in his platform
he guaranteed it would appeal to and benefit his voter base. In efforts to improve the
poor social situations, both candidates pledged to use economic means to improve them.
These promises benefited their voter base economically and socially, which helped to
increase the quantity of their support.
Both candidates promised to stop following the internationally prescribed
neoliberal reforms of previous governments in favor of a socialist governing ideology. In
speeches, Chavez and Morales denounced U.S. hegemonic efforts to control their
respective countries and the entire region by requiring nations to implement neoliberal
reforms when receiving IMF and World Bank assistance. Since these development
programs had not improved the social or economic situations of the poor, Chavez and
Morales were able to campaign on the promise that they would employ a socialist system
that would be a drastic change from previous models and actually reach the sectors of
their countries that were still waiting for the benefits of the Washington Consensus.
Unfortunately, political campaign promises of such drastic measures cannot be easily put
into practice in an unconsolidated democratic system because ofthe necessity to maintain
moderate policies.
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Political Tendencies of Chavez and Morales during their Presidencies
While in office both presidents have encountered varying degrees of difficulty in
implementing their political platforms. They have reverted to populistic measures to
guarantee that their \ oter base remains dedicated and supportive oftheir political
campaigns. Neither president has been able to undo all of the previously imposed
neoliberal refonns even when promoting socialist policies; their governments have
actually been social democratic.
Both governments have funded a majority of their policies from revenues from
the hydrocarbon sector and have capitalized on the sentiment that natural resources are
the property of the people and those profits be shared among the population. When
Chavez rewrote the constitution in 1999, he ensured that PDVSA would remain in the
hands of the government by creating Article 303. Chavez created the Bolivarian
Missions through presidential decree, which further increased the role ofPDVSA in the
development of his social and economic advancement agenda. Chavez has succeed in
advertising the drastic social improvements resulting from the Bolivarian Missions with
frequent speeches that laud the advances, declaring Venezuela “illiteracy free” and
publishing the Instituto NacionaJ de Estadistica(INE)results on February 2,2008 that
138

highlighted the lowering of poverty, illiteracy and inequality.

Social conditions have

improved during the Chavez administration, but the efficiency of spending has been
inefficient. Since he has taken power, the GINI coefficient of Venezuela has increased
139

from 0.44 in 2000 to 0.491 in 2007.

Chavez also modified the allocation of monies to
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the F1;m to give himself greater financial liberty to spend on infrastructure
improvements. During his campaign in 2005. Morales promised to call a constitutional
assembly to rewrite the constitution so that it would certify that the state controlled the
hydrocarbons sector. Political opposition has prevented a successful constitutional
assemblv. While there is no new constitution, with the IDH Morales has used
hydrocarbon resources to redistribute profits to appease his political supporters, despite
limited actual improvements. Morales benefited from the oil revenues of Venezuela
because Chavez has provided doctors and medical supplies to help improve the social
140

situation in Bolivia.
141

59.2 to 60.1.

The GINI coefficient has increased from 2005 to 2007 going from

Chavez and Morales have maintained popular enough by issuing

populistic promises, targeting economic reforms at their voter bases and/ or charismatic
speeches.
Chavez has tried unsuccessfully to implement social and economic development
programs without using oil revenues. Chavez has not developed the non-oil sector ofthe
economy to prevent the heavy dependence on oil revenues, yet after nine years of
government this portion has failed to grow independently, which continues to promulgate
the cyclical nature of Dutch Disease. Morales has not focused on other policies because
his priority has been the nationalization of the hydrocarbons sector and the attempt to
gather a constitutional assembly.
The popular support for Chavez has dwindled since his December 2006 electoral
victory. At the time, he received 63% of the vote in this election, but he only obtained
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49% of the \ otc in a constitutional referendum one year later,
populistically promulgated “socialism for the

Chavez has

century” on his weekly television show

Aid Presidente and as a means to create separation from the hegemonic U.S.. These
elections have limited his voter base by creating political programs and marginalized his
middle class supporters by increasing the role of the state. By losing his alliance with the
middle class, Cha\ ez strictly focuses his political promises on the poor. His political
support has been limited, as demonstrated in his diminishing national support in national
referendums. Until December 2007, Chavez had never lost a referendum, but his
constitutional referendum was defeated with 51% of the vote, while 44% abstained from
143

voting—the lowest turnout in his presidency.

The referendum sought to centralize the

power of the presidency, eliminate presidential term limits and increase the role ofthe
state in the economy. With the loss of the middle class support and large abstention rate.
it is clear that Chavez is losing his power to mobilize his supporters and attempted to
install a socialist political agenda that was radical enough to unite his fragmented
opposition.
Chavez has limited the focus of his political programs on the lower class.
Morales first had to increase his base of political support by moderating his policies while
still using anti-neoliberal, charismatic speeches. Political obstacles have prevented the
advancement of two of his major pre-election promises, a new constitution and a land
reform policy. He has been forced to moderate his policies by maintaining a more
conservative economic model. He has successfully incorporated the non-indigenous
lower class, yet has not been able to reach out the middle classes. Since the political
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division remains so fixed in Bolivia, Morales has succeeded in mobilizing support,
especially around the continuing debate concerning the constitutional assembly. Despite
limited economic reforms. Morales continues to use his populistic speeches to mobilize
political support and to reinforce where he wants to take the country.
Analysis of the Sty les of Government and Governing Structures
Evo Morales' policies did not match his promised governing ideology. Bolivia
elected him because of his socialist promises and populistic rhetoric. After his election in
2005, Morales encountered strong opposition as he tried to implement his campaign
agenda without opposition. Given political deadlock, however much of his political
platform has been stymied. To obtain greater support, Morales expanded his voter base
from policies strictly related to the coca growers union to a wider platform to encompass
a larger number of infringed Bolivians. The politically divided population coupled with a
limited ability to pass legislation has prevented him from developing a more progressive
political platform.
Despite political opposition. Morales has implemented social democratic policies
and used populistic rhetoric to maintain political support. After the 2005 election.
Morales embarked on a more moderate policy toward the utilization of natural resources.
abandoned U.S.-based neoliberal economic policies, and implemented wealth
redistribution policies along with increased rights and representation of
indigenous/peasant groups and coca growers. With the rising prices of natural resources
since his election. Morales has had his governmental budget increase astronomically. He
has increased the state's role in shaping the society’s economic and social life by
reallocating IDH funds and gaining better contracts with multinational hydrocarbon
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companies after nationalizing the industry. The government has also played a larger role
in developing social programs and promoting greater educational opportunities. The
Bolivian economy has maintained free market principles during the Morales government.
To maintain popular support during the elongated process of rewriting the constitution,
Morales uses populistic promises and speeches to rally the support of his voter base
against the opposition.
Similarly, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez has advocated a governing ideology more
radical than his actual policies. Gaining notoriety after his failed coup attempt in 1992,
consistently, Chavez has promoted the interests of the Venezuelan poor. He wanted to
extend the powers and reach of his presidency. While in office since 1999, Chavez has
met opposition that has partially obstructed his efforts to enact his political agenda. The
failed constitutional referendum in 2007 demonstrated that the majority ofthe population
did not want him to expand his power in such a manner. This was Chavez’s attempt to
realize his socialist promises, but its failure indicated the limited appeal ofthe radical
ideology employed in his rhetoric.
As demonstrated by his implemented policies, Chavez’s governing ideology is
social democratic and his governing style is populistic. He has been able to bypass
Congressional obstacles to promote his policies with various referendums. Benefiting
from the rapidly increasing petroleum prices worldwide, Chavez has enacted an
aggressive campaign to benefit the nation’s poor through the Bolivarian Missions and the
FEM. After nine years in office, the state’s role in shaping and directing the Venezuela’s
economic and social endeavors. Chavez has not succeeded in implementing socialist
economic policies. His economic policies have respected the free market, while
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emphasizing wealth redistribution, especially from natural resource revenues. The
Chavez go\ eminent has frequent!) used a populistic style of government with programs
specificall) benefiting Chavez's political supporters to ensure that his popularity is
maintained. Although his populistic programs have not been very efficient, the excessive
spending of windfall oil profits are not being spent just to be spent, but has been used on
programs that are making an impact and providing social and economic improvements.
Since the different development programs have made a social impact, they have
guaranteed significant political support too. Chavez’s populist rhetoric denotes his
explicit socialist hopes, but the Constitutional Assembly and citizens are limiting
Venezuela to a social democracy.
While Chavez and Morales profess to be developing their countries toward “21^^
century socialism.*’ the very different means toward reaching these goals are an
indication that there is no unanimity within these countries or the region toward a specific
political agenda. Both politicians have promised to use their countries’ vast natural
resources as means to develop their social and economic development policies toward
advancing their political platforms and political goals in very different ways. The
political goals and messages, which Chavez has built his presidency around, are the
elimination of poverty, illiteracy and general social development within Venezuela and
throughout Latin America. Chavez exclusively relied upon funding from windfall oil
profits to help advance these specific goals. Morales’ government has also experienced
drastic increases in governmental revenues because of the rapidly increasing world price
of natural resources. He has chosen to build his presidency around the redistribution of
wealth and indigenous rights. Morales’ government has demonstrated its preference
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toward a focus on altering the distribution of income within the country as demonstrated
by changing the method of redistributing hydrocarbon profits in the IDH. A centerpiece
of his presidential campaign was to call a constitutional assembly, which hopes to
guarantee further redistribution of natural resource revenues along with constitutionally
affirming greater indigenous rights and representation in both local and the national
government.
Both the Chavez and Morales governments strive to improve general social
welfare, but they have utilized their natural resource revenues to target different facets of
their respective populations. The utilization of windfall natural resource profits to create
policies to benefit their voter bases indicates that their political goals are not the same.
Each has developed policies and programs with their governmental revenues from natural
resources to benefit different voter bases. These policies indicate that their political
approaches and the goals of the two countries are dichotomous. The Chavez government
initially targeted both the middle and lower classes. In recent years his focus has
centered solely on the lower classes with natural resource driven governmental programs
dedicated toward alleviating poverty, providing greater healthcare and increasing literacy
that have been implemented in lower income areas. Since the programs have only
benefited the middle class, Chavez has not been successful with using the windfall profits
of the oil industry to maintain his voter base. The isolation of the lower class and
elimination of the upper middle class from his support has demonstrated his political
preference toward developing the poorer sector of Venezuela. Conversely, Morales has
focused his social development programs on promoting greater indigenous representation
and benefiting indigenous populations and regions of the country. Morales has increased
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his voter base by moderating his economic policy. The stalemates over the constitutional
assembly within Boli\ ia have prevented much development in this area.
Both presidents wanted to govern from a more radical agenda, but their actual
government followed left-of-center social democratic principles. Morales and Chavez
employed a more radical rhetoric than the actual implemented policies to maintain their
image as messengers of change. This assuages their voter base while their more
moderate policies pacify the opposition. Due to the rhetoric used, the media portrays
these politicians' governments as significantly more left-of-center than their actual
policies indicate.
What is the Pink Wave?
'fhe governments of Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales are part of the general
leftward movement in Latin America. Both presidents utilize their natural resource
revenues very differently to advance their political platform and to target and maintain
their voter bases. Both Chavez’s and Morales’ governments are in practice social
democratic and with a populist political style. More specifically, it is an indication that
the “pink wave” is not a precise term to describe the shift in political ideology that Latin
America currently exhibits. The shift to the left is less radical than the media indicates it
is. The two governments focus on increasing social progress through a variety of
political means throughout the region, but they do not represent a radical ideological
shift. What the media calls the pink wave is less broad ideologically than suggested, who
identified it as both a political and ideological movement away from neoliberal, U.S.
inspired democracy. In fact, the pink wave, according to the implemented policies ofthe
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presidents of the most radical governments in the region, is comprised ofsocially
progressive democracies.
The media is commenting on rhetoric, not policies. Commentators have
popularized the term “p*^^ wave" to give it the connotation of a massive leftward lurch
aw ay from the U.S. toward promoting a socialist Latin America. In fact, both Evo
Morales and I lugo Chavez have promised in public addresses to deliver radical political
and social change, primarily by utilizing their substantial natural resources revenues to
fund their programs. While Chavez has funded social programs such as FEM,the
Bolivarian Missions and PetroCaribe with w'indfall profits, the media has commented
only on his rhetoric. Similarly, Morales has altered the distribution of hydrocarbon
profits to try to provide greater social development and hopes to rewrite the constitution
to legally make the hydrocarbons property of the state, yet the media has only reported
his populistic rhetoric. Morales and Chavez have a decidedly different governing
ideology and personal political ideology. The media analyzes the personal political
ideology of politicians encompassed within the pink wave, which is much more radical
than governing ideology.
It is evident that even the most radical and leftist governments labeled under the
pink wave at a fundamental level are following democratic procedure and the pink wave
does not characterize a drastic political ideology movement away from democracy, but
simply a change in the type of democratic government in power. As exhibited by the
most ideologically extreme examples of pink wave countries, Venezuela and Bolivia
demonstrate that the most drastic governments still are characterized by social
democracy. The vastly different policies utilizing natural resources demonstrate that the
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individual political goals of Morales and Chavez are very different. The pink wave is not
applicable as a term to characterize the left-of-center movement within Latin American
because there is not a monolithic socialist wave as indicated by the media and the
implemented policies are very different in each country.
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Epilogue: The Future Roles of Venezuela and Bolivia with the Region?
With the recent resignation of Cuba's Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez has taken over
as the region's face of opposition toward the United States. With such a monolithic
figure in Latin American politics no longer present, the ability for Chavez and/ or Evo
Morales to gain greater regional and international notoriety is very plausible ifthe prices
of natural resources continue to increase. Both presidents have greater potential for
influence because unlike Cuba they do not have to rely upon an external source for
funding, they will not be adversely affected by the rising costs of natural resources and
the U.S. influence in the region is declining.
For Chavez to become the next Castro—in terms of influence and regional
respect—it is dependent upon his international programs continuing to develop, social
spending becoming more efficient and regaining the support of the middle class. Chavez
can feasibly strengthen Venezuela’s role within the region with programs such as
PetroCaribe, the Banco del Sur and country-specific loans to help other countries pay off
loans to international lending organizations. Due to PetroCaribe, Venezuela has been
able to direct support and influence from the U.S. toward Venezuela within the
Caribbean. A region that has fostered progressive governments in the past (e.g. Grenada
in 1983) that were quenched by the U.S., now through developmental loans from
Venezuela countries like Dominica are able to develop left-of-center political alternatives
without external smothering. Similarly, Venezuela has been the leader in establishing the
Banco del Sur to give the region an alternative to the IMF or World Bank’s economic
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development loans with attached policy prescriptions. This bank has gained support from
Venezuela. Argentina. Paraguay. Uruguay, Brazil, Ecuador and Bolivia to promote an
intra-regional bank without strict economic requirements for borrowing. In a similar
vein, Venezuela has provided loans and encouragement to Argentina and Ecuador to
follow its example and pay off all of their loans to the IMF and World Bank.
Aside from international involvement, if Chavez wants to amplify Venezuela’s
role he must address domestic issues as well. While he has dedicated a substantial
amount of his political rhetoric and funding toward promoting social and economic
development, he must make his programs more efficient and broader reaching. While
Venezuela spends the most per recipient for its social development programs,it has not
established itself as significantly more developed than much ofthe region. With the
prices of oil continuing to rise, Chavez must be more efficient in his spending to
guarantee greater returns on his investment to allow his model to be exported and trusted.
In addition, these programs must encompass more Venezuelans because his recent loss of
the middle class's support has adversely affected his political efficiency and success. His
policies have been so specific toward the lower class, the middle class has become
marginalized and without their support, he cannot continue to successfully progress his
policies. If Chavez can regain domestic stability and support coupled with his regional
initiatives continuing to expand and be successful then he represents a viable option to
become a lucrative candidate for the face of the region.
On the other hand, Morales has continually played a third fiddle to Castro and
Chavez within the region, but with Castro stepping down Morales has the ability to
increase his regional role and improve the representation of the indigenous peoples within
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the region. Before Morales can assume an increased regional responsibility, he must gain
domestic stabilitN and a stronger international image. Within Bolivia with the drastic
political div isions and the inability to successfully hold a constitutional assembly is
inhibiting his ability to legislate change within his country. Immediately after his
election in December 2005, Morales tried to call a constitutional assembly to allow him
to legally change former policies and programs to help develop his indigenous-based
platform. Hopefully, with the new call for a constitutional assembly in April 2008,
Morales will be able to maintain the majority support within the country and pacify the
opposition enough to allow for the democratic process to occur. Morales cannot
plausibly strengthen his international image, especially within the indigenous community,
if Bolivia is not internally stable. Morales is in a unique position as an indigenous leader
to unite and promote indigenous communities throughout the region and world that will
only occur without greater political stability.
Because both Venezuela and Bolivia are democratic countries, there is no
guarantee that either leader will remain in power indefinitely as Fidel Castro was in
Cuba. Neither Chavez nor Morales has the ability to solely gain regional influence
because of the possibility of democratic change, but each has the possibility ofimproving
their regional role. Chavez has the potential to unite the region through economic
development and Morales has the capability of presenting a united indigenous
representation and together they have a strong ability to alter the regional mindset toward
promoting a more socially progressive model away from the more conservative one
endorsed by the United States.
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Appendix A
1. Do you agree that the Hydroearbons Law(No 1689) approved by Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada should be repealed?
2. Do you agree that the slate should recover ov\Tiership overall hydrocarbons at the
wellhead?
3. Do you agree that YPFB (the state-oil company)should be re-founded, recovering the
state's ownership of stakes held in the part-privitised oil companies, so that it can take
part in all stages of the hydrocarbon production chain?
4. Do you agree with President Carlos Mesa's policy of using as a strategic resource to
recover sovereign and viable access to the sea?
5. Do you agree that Bolivia should export gas under a national policy framework that
ensures supplies for Boliviems; encourages the industrialization of gas on national
territory; levies taxes and/or royalties on oil companies up to 50% ofthe production value
of oil and gas; and earmarks resources from the export and industrialisation of gas mainly
for education, health, roads and jobs?
According the The Economist 17 July 2004
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